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1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This brief is filed by Defendant-Respondent! Cross Appellant CitiMortgage, Inc.
("CitiMortgage"). This appeal concerns a priority dispute between Plaintiff!Appellant Cross
Respondent U.S. Bank National Association, N.D. ("U.S. Bank") and CitiMortgage. The dispute
arose between U.S. Bank and CitiMortgage when U.S. Bank filed a Complaint to judicially
foreclose upon a deed of trust secured by the subject real property owned by Defendants Herbert
T. Thomas and Julie A. Thomas (the "Thomas's"). U.S. Bank sought a detennination by the
District Court to declare that U.S. Bank had first priority lien position over CitiMortgage, and
now appeals to reverse the trial court's detennination that CitiMortgage has priority over U.S.
Bank with regard to the subject property. CitiMortgage has filed a cross-appeal to reverse the
District Court's decision that CitiMortgage was not entitled to attorney fees, and remand for
findings with regard to the amount of fees to which it is entitled.
B. Concise Statement of Facts
The facts in this case are straightforward and largely undisputed. On August 30, 2005, the
Thomas's opened a home equity line of credit for $1.8 million with U.S. Bank ("HELOC"), I
which was secured by a deed of trust upon the property in favor of U.S. Bank (the "The U.S.
Bank Deed of Trust"). (R. Vol. I, pp. 18-25).
In October 2005, Blaine County Title ("BCT") was contacted by CitiMortgage to request a
title commitment for the property. (R. Vol. I, p. 74, ~ 7). BCT issued a Commitment for Title
Insurance, effective October 19, 2005 (the "Commitment"). (R. Vol. I, p. 74, ~ 8; R. Vol. I, pp.
79-86). Under the Commitment, CitiMortgage would be issued a policy under certain conditions
including the delivery of a deed of trust from the Thomas's to CitiMortgage securing a note of
1 While U.S. Bank explains what a HELOC is in the Appellant's Brief, pp. 1-2, no evidence exists in the record or
was put before the trial court concerning bank and loan processes.
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$4.99 million and the release of all deeds of trust on the property, including The U.S. Bank Deed
of Trust. (R. Vol. I, p. 74,

~

9).

In November 2005, the Thomas's sought a loan from CitiMortgage to payoff and close the
HELOC and other debts using real property located at 104 Grey Eagle, Sun Valley, Idaho (the
"property") as collateral for the loan ("CitiMortgage Loan"). (R. Vol. I, p. 144,

~~

7-9).

Pursuant to the Thomas's loan application, CitiMortgage agreed to lend the Thomas's $4.99
million, which the Thomas's agreed would be secured by a first priority Deed of Trust in favor of
CitiMortgage, encumbering the property. (R. Vol. I, p. 145,

~~

10,14-15; R. Vol. I, pp. 148-53).

In accordance with the Commitment, BCT commenced work to determine payoff amounts in
order to release the U.S. Bank Deed of Trust. (See R. Vol. I, 75,

~

10). In a refinance, it was

BCT's standard procedure to work with local branches in securing refinances where possible;
because there was a local U.S. Bank branch in Ketchum, the work involving the payoff and
reconveyance of the U.S. Bank Deed of Trust was accomplished locally. (R. Vol. I, pp. 75-76,
~~

11, 28).
On November 22,2005, Kathy Seal ("Seal"), escrow officer ofBCT that assisted with

handling the Thomas-CitiMortgage closing, received a fax from the local U.S. Bank branch,
which was an Account Inquiry for Thomas's' U.S. Bank account ("Thomas Account"). (R. Vol.
I, p. 75,

~~

12, 15; R. Vol. I, p. 86). The Account Inquiry set forth the amount owed under the

Thomas Account as of November 22,2005, and stated the amount owing was $1,840,991.56,
with interest accruing at $351.9752619 per diem. (R. Vol. I, p. 75,

~

16). Seal used that

information from the Account Inquiry to calculate the amount owed on the Thomas Account as
of November 30,2013, which would be $1,843,807.40. (R. Vol. I, p. 75,

~

17). Using that

infonnation, Seal prepared the Settlement Statement for the CitiMortgage Loan. (R. Vol. I, p.
75, ~ 18; R. Vol. I, R. Vol. I, pp. 87-91).
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On November 23,2005, the Thomas's closed on the CitiMortgage Loan in the office ofBCT,
where they signed the loan commitment, which memorialized their intent to close the U.S. Bank
HELOC2 (R. Vol. I, p. 76, ~~ 23-25; R. Vol. III, pp. 553-54, 557-64). On or about November 29,
2005, BCT prepared a disbursement worksheet and a check dated November 29,2005, made out
to U.S. Bank for $1,843.807.40, and stating on the face of the check that it was to "payoffloan"
(the "Check"). (R. Vol. I, p. 76, ~~ 26-27; R. Vol. III, p. 554).
In a refinance dealing with local branches like U.S. Bank, it was standard procedure for BCT
to deliver a demand for release of a deed of trust with the check payment. (R. Vol. I, p. 76, ~
28). It was also always standard procedure for BCT to staple such release demand letters to
checks prior to hand delivering them to the local bank so as to be sure the checks reached their
intended recipients. (R. Vol. I, p. 77, ~ 33; R. Vol. II, p. 441, 69:4-22). The delivery of the
check with the demand for release has always resulted in the release of the mortgage or deed of
trust. (R. Vol. I, p. 76-77, ~~ 29-30). More specifically, during 2005 and 2006, BCT refinanced
no fewer than eleven (11) U.S. Bank lines of credit under this procedure, and each of these
closings resulted in the reconveyance of the respective The U.S. Bank Deed of Trust. (R. Vol. I,
p. 77, ~~ 30-31).
BCT processed the Thomas's' CitiMortgage refinance in compliance with BCT's standard
business procedure, as set forth above; thus here, BCT prepared their standard release demand
letter ("Release Demand Letter") and the Check, which were then hand delivered to the local

2 At his deposition, Herbert Thomas testified that he and his wife signed the loan commitment for the CitiMortgage
Loan. (R. Vol. III, p. 553,32:14-23). The Additional Conditions Rider portion of the loan commitment provided
"In addition to being paid off, the U.S. Bank $2,000,000 home equity line of credit (as well as any other lines of
credit secured by the subject property) is to be terminated." (R. Vol. III, p. 562, ~ (B)(5); R. Vol. III, p. 554,36:1437:25). From these facts, the District Court found the Thomas's intended to close the U.S. Bank HELOC. (See R.
VoL IV, p. 777, ~ 2 (ordering issue 5 of the First Order Limiting Trial Issues shall be clarified that, based off Herbert
Thomas's' deposition and deposition exhibits, "As a matter offact the Court concludes that Defendants Herbert and
Julie Thomas ("Thomas") intended to payoff and close their U.S. Bank line of credit as part of the CitiMortgage
refinance; ... "). Nothing in the Second Order Limiting Trial Issues has been appealed by U.S. Bank.
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u.s. Bank branch.

(R. Vol. I, p. 77, ~~ 32-34; R. Vol. I, p. 93). The Release Demand Letter was

made out to Ms. Lisa Guinn. (See R. Vol. I, p. 93).
Yet U.S. Bank did not reconvey its deed of trust. (See R. Vol. I, p. 115).
It is undisputed that the Ketchum branch of U.S. Bank received and processed BCT's Check

on November 29,2005, for the sum of$I,843,807.40. (R. Vol. I, p. 114; R. Vol. I, p. 138). U.S.
Bank then deposited excess funds into the Thomas's U.S. Bank checking account. (R. Vol. III,
p. 627, ~ 10). It is also undisputed that Lisa Guinn processed the Check and applied it to the
Thomas's' account in full satisfaction of the HELOC. (See R. Vol. I, pp. 115, 140). Instead,
U.S. Bank has denied receiving the Release Demand Letter, which is the sole factual question in
this case. (See Tr. p.38; 11. 11-22).
In or around 2005, U.S. Bank's branch payoff procedures were irregular. (Tr.212-13,ll.4-25,
1-14; Trial Exhibit 513) (stating U.S. Bank "did not have the controls like we do today on
HELOCS"). Still, at that time, it's imaging, receiving and routing procedures of checks and
"ancillary loan documents" (release demand letters would be an ancillary loan document) were
apparently set and required the immediate separation of checks and release demand letters at the
branch, which are then separately sent to different parts of the country to be imaged. 3 (R. Vol.
III, p. 627, ~ 14; accord R. Vol. III, pp. 619-623). Unfortunately, the original check is
4

unavailable for inspection; after imaging the check, it was ultimately destroyed. (Tr. 135,11. 411 ).
On November 29,2005, the CitiMortgage Deed of Trust was recorded with the Blaine
County Recorder's office as Instrument No. 529429. (R. Vol. I, p. 145,

~

12; R. Vol. I, pp. 155-

3 According to U.S. Bank personnel familiar with the process, all checks are separated from their ancillary
documents. That is, all ancillary loan documents delivered to a local branch would be placed in a transmittal bag
known as a "Green Bag," while checks made payable to U.S. Bank for the purpose or fendering payment are
processed at the branch and the physical checks are then placed in a clear "Proof Bag." (R. Vol. III, 627, p. 627, ~
14; accord R. Vol. III, p. 620, ~ 6(a)). The clear Proof Bag is then routed to Portland, Oregon, while the Green Bag
is taken by courier to Fargo, North Dakota. (R. Vol. III, p. 628, rr 15; accord R. Vol. III, pp. 620-21, rr 6(b)-(c)).
4 The original physical checks are "held" for 45-60 days after processing, then are shredded. (Tr. 135, 11. 4-11).
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69). The Thomas's ultimately defaulted on both the U.S. Bank Loan and the CitiMortgage Loan,
and this litigation ensued. (R. Vol. I, p. 145,,-r 13; R. Vol. I, pp. 18-25).
C. Course of Proceedings

The proceedings in this case ultimately involved a total of three (3) summary judgment
proceedings and a trial, which collectively sought to establish supporting facts and inferences
relative to the narrow factual issue of whether the Release Demand Letter had been delivered to
U.S. Bank. (See R. Vol. VI, pp. 1160-73).
On June 17,2011, U.S. Bank filed its Complaint against Thomas and CitiMortgage
seeking to judicially foreclose the U.S. Bank Deed of Trust. (R. Vol. I, pp. 18-26). More
specifically in its Complaint, U.S. Bank sought an order declaring the CitiMortgage Deed of
Trust "junior and subordinate to the lien priority of Plaintiff U.S. Bank." (R. Vol. I, p. 25, ,-r 7).
On July 22, 2011, CitiMortgage filed its Answer denying that the U.S. Bank Deed of
Trust had priority and alleging affirmative defenses including, inter alia, that the CitiMortgage
Deed of Trust had senior priority over the U.S. Bank Deed of Trust pursuant to I.C. §§ 45-1502
et seq. and I.C. § 45-901 et seq. and was thus not entitled to a judgment of foreclosure. (R. Vol. I,

p.33).
On September 13, 2011, U.S. Bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to
dispose of all issues in the case, including whether U.S. Bank had priority over the CitiMortgage
Deed of Trust. 5 (R. Vol. I, pp. 70-72). On September 20, 2011, CitiMortgage filed its cross
motion for summary judgment on the lien priority issue. 6 (R. Vol. I, pp. 184-85).

5 U.S. Bank's Motion was supported by the Affidavit of Mathew Paulson in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. Vol. I, pp. 50-69), its Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Vol.
I, p. 38-49), and its Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Vol. II, pp. 342-51).
Additionally, U.S. Bank later supplemented its Motion with the Affidavits of Loren P. Madson (R. Vol. I, p. 18695), Lisa Guinn (R. Vol. I, pp. 196-240), and Terry C. Copple (R. Vol. II, pp. 241-95).
6 CitiMortgage's Motion was supported by the Affidavits of John Linnenbrink (R. Vol. I, pp. 143-69), Katie Scott
(R. Vol. II, pp. 296-321), Kathy Seal (R. Vol. I, pp. 73-104), and Terri R. Pickens (R. Vol. I, pp. 105-142), and its
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Vol. I, pp. 170-83).
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On February 6, 2012, the tIial court heard the parties' cross motions for summary
judgment, and made certain findings and inferences with regard to whether the Release Demand
Letter was delivered to U.S. Bank, and subsequently issued an Order Limiting Trial Issues
Pursuant to Rule 56(d) ("First Order Re: Summary Judgment"). (R. Vol. III, p. 515-521). The
First Order Re: Summary Judgment noted that, as agreed by the parties, the question of priority
boiled down to a narrow question of fact concerning whether BCT delivered the Release
Demand Letter to U.S. Bank. (R. Vol. III, p. 617).
The First Order Re: Summary Judgment expressly left four (4) issues of material fact that
would remain for trial between U.S. Bank and CitiMortgage, namely: 1) whether the Check bore
visible staple marks (thereby helping to confirm that the Release Demand Letter had been stapled
to it and was thus received by U.S. Bank); 2) details concerning U.S. Bank's document scanning
and processing procedures (referred to as the "green bag issue"); 3) an explanation of why two
different copies of the payoff check were presented to the trial court 7; and 4) whether the
Thomas's instructed BCT to payoff and close the HELOC as part of the CitiMortgage Loan. (R.
Vol. III, pp. 515-21). The District Court invited the parties to submit further motions for
summary judgment on these four (4) issues for the purpose of further narrowing trial issues.
U.S. Bank does not challenge any portion of the First Order Re: Summary Judgment.
On March 15,2012, CitiMortgage filed its Second Motion for Summary Judgment,8
where it sought to clarify and dispose of issues relating to different copies of the payoff check

7 This issue was resolved at CitiMortgage's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. In her affidavit, Kathy Seal
explained that the copy of the check attached to her first affidavit, (R. Vol. I, p. 92) was actually a check stub. (R.
Vol. III, pp.540-41, ~~ 8-9). Seal's second affidavit then attached both the check stub and copy of the Check itself.
(See R. Vol. III, pp. 544,546).
8 CitiMortgage's second motion was supported by the Affidavits of Kathy Seal (R. Vol. III, pp. 539-46) and Terri R.
Pickens (R. Vol. III, pp. 547-73), its Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R.
Vol. III, pp. 533-38), and its Memorandum in Further Support of Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R.
Vol. III, pp. 588-94). In opposition to CitiMortgage's second motion, U.S. Bank filed the Plaintiff's Opposition to
Defendant CitiMortgage's Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. Vol. III, p 582-87) and the supporting
affidavit of Michael E. Band (R. Vol. III, p 574-81).
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(issue 3 in the First Order Re: Summary Judgment), and determining that the Thomas's, in fact,
instructed BCT to payoff and close the HELOC as part of the CitiMortgage Loan closing (issue
4). (R. Vol. III, pp. 530-32). The District Court heard CitiMortgage's Second Motion for
Summary Judgment, granted the motion, and issued its Second Order Limiting Trial Issues
Pursuant to Rule 56(d) disposing of these issues. (R. Vol. IV, p. 776-78). U.S. Bank does not
challenge any portion of the Second Order Re: Summary Judgment.
On April 27, 2012, U.S. Bank filed its Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment9
seeking an order finding that staple holes were visible on images of the Check (issue 1 in the
First Order Re: Summary Judgment) and the "green bag issue" (issue 2), which clarified that the
Check and Release Demand Letter would have been detached from one another at the Ketchum
Branch and sent to separate processing centers to be imaged by U.S. Bank, the national
association. U.S. Bank further sought summary judgment on certain issues oflaw that are
brought for appeal here, and summary judgment on the ultimate issue of whether U.S. Bank had
priority over CitiMortgage. (R. Vol. III, pp. 595-98). The District Court granted U.S. Bank's
motion to the extent of clarifying the green bag issue, denied the motion with regard to the
visibility of staple marks and priority, and declined to rule on the legal issues raised by U.S.
Bank until trial. 10 (R. Vol. IV, pp. 779-82).
Consequently, as a result of its pretrial orders and findings and inferences made on the
record, only the narrow question of whether staple holes were visible on scanned images of the
Check possessed by U.S. Bank were left on for trial.

9 U.S. Bank's Motion was supported by the affidavits of Tylor Peterson (R. Vol. III., p 619-624), Matthew G.
Paulson (R. Vol. III., . 625-31), Vicky Salfeld-Kotiga (R. Vol. III., p 632-35), Keith J. Powers (R. Vol. III., p 63653), Loren P. Madson (R. Vol. III., p 654-668), Deborah Mosher (R. Vol. III., . 669-83), Michael E. Band (R. Vol.
IV., p 684-775), and its Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff U.S. Bank's Second for Partial Summary Judgment
[sic] (R. Vol. III., p 599-618). Due to U.S. Bank's untimeliness in filing the motion, CitiMortgage was unable to
submit a written response, but did not oppose the "green bag" issue.
10 While the Third Order Limiting Issues Pursuant to I.R.c.P. 56(d) expressly references and incorporates its oral
ruling at hearing on the matter, U.S. Bank has failed to include that hearing in the Reporter's Transcript on appeal.
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On July 10,2012, the trial was held. No expert testimony was presented to the trial court.
Instead, U.S. Bank put on testimony of U.S. Bank employee Keith Powers ("Powers") about
U.S. Bank imaging processes and various images of the Check, culminating in Power's lay
opinion that staple holes were not visible on the scanned copies. CitiMortgage rebutted the
testimony with paralegal Shannon Pearson's ("Pearson") testimony recounting her "low fi"
experiment, which utilized copy equipment with the same or better dot pixels per square inch
(dpsi) imaging capability. Pearson's experiment simply demonstrated that a check could in fact
bear staple holes, which could be invisible on a good copied image of the check. (Tr. pp. 18899,11.8-25,1-11).
On September 24,2012, the District Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
law and ultimately concluded that The CitiMortgage Deed of Trust had priority over The U.S.
Bank Deed of Trust. (R. Vol. VI, pp. 1160-73). Importantly, the trial court's findings were
based upon its rulings, findings, and inferences during all three (3) of the summary judgment
proceedings in addition to the findings adduced from trial on the staple hole issue. (R. Vol. VI,
pp. 1160-73.) The trial court held that because it was more probable than not that the Release
Demand Letter was delivered to U.S. Bank with the Check, which was indisputably deposited by
U.S. Bank on the day of closing, U.S. Bank bore the burden of releasing its deed of trust.
Following entry of Judgment in the matter, CitiMortgage filed its Memorandum of Costs
and Fees seeking attorney fees as a matter of right pursuant to I.C. §§ 45-1514 and 45-915, under
I.e. § 12-121, and pursuant to I.C. § 10-1210, which u.s. Bank opposed. On December 3, 2012,
the Court heard the attorney fees issue and ruled that CitiMortgage's request was denied.

II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the District Court err when it denied CitiMortgage's attorney fees, concluding that
CitiMortgage was not entitled to its fees?
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III. ARGUMENT

A. Standard of Review
The appellate court will set aside a trial court's findings of fact only if they are clearly
erroneous. Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 506, 65 P.3d 525, 528 (2003). In deciding whether
findings of fact are clearly erroneous, the appellate court detennines whether the findings are
supported by substantial, competent evidence. Id.

Evidence is regarded as substantial if a

reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in detennining whether a disputed point
of fact has been proven. Ransom v. Topaz Marketing, L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2, 4
(2006). Substantial and competent evidence is "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion." Henderson v. Eclipse Traffic Control & Flagging, Inc., 147
Idaho 628,631,213 P.3d 718,721 (2009). Evidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable
trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in detennining whether a disputed point of fact has
been proven.

Argosy Trust v. Wininger, 141 Idaho 570, 572, 114 P.3d 128, 130 (2005).

Substantial and competent evidence is less than a preponderance of evidence, but more than a
mere scintilla. Evans v. Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 478, 849 P.2d 934, 939 (1993). Substantial
and competent evidence need not be uncontradicted, nor does it need to necessarily lead to a
certain conclusion; it need only be of such sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable
minds could reach the same conclusion as the fact finder. See Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95
Idaho 732, 736, 518 P.2d 1194, 1198 (1974).
The appellate court exercises free review over the District Court's conclusions of law to
detennine whether the court correctly stated the applicable law and whether the legal conclusions
are sustained by the facts found. Neider, 138 Idaho at 506, 65 P.3d at 528; Conley v. Whittlesey,
133 Idaho 265,269,985 P.2d 1127, 1131 (1999); Willis v. Willis, 33 Idaho 353, 357-58,194 P.
470,472 (1920).
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This Court is tasked to determine whether the factual findings of the District Court are
supported by substantial and competent evidence or whether its findings are clearly erroneous.
Once that determination is made, this Court must exercise free review over the District Court's
conclusions of law which will ultimately decide this case. CitiMortgage submits that after this
Court reviews the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the District Court, this Court
will affirm the District Court's decision that CitiMortgage has priority over U.S. Bank, and will
determine as a matter oflaw that the Release Demand Letter was sufficient to make demand
under I.C. § 45-1514. CitiMortgage further submits that it is entitled to attorney fees under I.e.
§§ 45-1514 and 45-915, or in the alternative, I.C. §§ 12-121 or 10-1210, and that the matter
should be remanded for an entry of order requiring a finding of the amount of those fees.

B. Legal Analysis
The District Court's decision that CitiMortgage delivered the Release Demand Letter to U.S.
Bank on November 29,2005, and therefore has priority over U.S. Bank, is supported by
substantial and competent evidence and cannot be disturbed on appeal. Furthermore, the Release
Demand Letter is sufficient to demand release of the U.S. Bank Deed of Trust pursuant to I.C. §
45-1514. Finally, CitiMortgage is entitled to its attorney fees due to U.S. Bank's failure to
reconvey its deed oftrust.

1. The District Court's Findings Support the Conclusion that the Release

Demand Letter was Delivered
As a threshold matter, U.S. Bank incorrectly £i-ames the case as solely dependent on the
narrow factual issue of whether staple marks are discernable on copies ofthe Check. In so
arguing, U.S. Bank ignores the record. The District Court's ultimate conclusion that the Release
Demand Letter was delivered to U.S. Bank was based on numerous inferences and facts that

RESPONDENT'S BRlEF - 10

were established during a series of summary judgment motions as well as a trial, where the lone
remaining factual issue of staple marks remained. Simply put, the question of whether staple
holes were visible on copies of the Check was simply not dispositive of the issue. I I
Prior to making any findings and inferences, the District Court properly framed the sole
issue in the case as follows:
It's an issue of fact. It's a-counsel have agreed it's a court trial, and there are
cross-motions on this identical issue. Each party submitted affidavits. The sole
issue is what happened to the release demand letter and what are the most
probable inferences. And so I'm going to give you all the inferences that I can
draw from the evidence. And I have heard both of you say we're going to be back
here in six months if you don't make a ruling on this, but there are some little
teeny, tiny issues of fact that are not resolved that I'm going to raise - I think the
evidence raises questions, and I'll tell you what those are when I'm done.
But I'm going to give you all the probable inferences that I arrive at to this
point. I'm going to narrow the issues under Rule 56(d), and then I'm going to
say, all right, when we get to trial, here's the only issue on this that I'm going to
permit unless someone else--unless someone, for good cause shown or whatever,
moves the Court and says we've got some additional evidence on this point we
want to submit.
(Tr. p. 57, 11. 1-20; see also Tr. p. 76, 11. 2-9)(noting the trial court would not accept any other
evidence on the issue of delivery ofthe Release Demand Letter without prior motion to the court
and a finding of good cause. U.S. Bank made no such motion.).
The District Court made over a dozen findings and inferences bearing on the narrow issue of
whether the Release Demand Letter was delivered to U.S. Bank that were completely unrelated
to the staple hole issue. Importantly, none of these findings and inferences have been challenged
by U.S. Bank on appeal. This is important because irrespective of what the court found at trial
regarding the existence of staple holes, in the context of the other undisputed facts and inferences
11 The Court's conclusion that the Release Demand Letter was delivered to U.S. Bank expressly incorporated and
was based upon more than the narrow trial issue of whether staple marks were visible on U.S. Bank's copies of the
Check. The District Court's decision was based on 1) oral findings and most probable inferences made in open
court at hearing on the parties' cross motion for summary judgment, 2) the Order Limiting Trial Issues Pursuant to
Rule 56(d), 3) Order Granting in Part and Denying in Order Limiting Trial Issues Pursuant to Rule 56 (d), 4) Second
Order Limiting Trial Issues Pursuant to Rule 56(d), 5) Third Order Limiting Trial Issues Pursuant to Rule 56(d), and
6) Order Regarding Stipulation of the Parties Regarding Herbert T. Thomas and Julie A. Thomas. (R. Vol. VI, pp.
1161-62).
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in the record-practically all of which militate in CitiMortgage's favor-the trial court's
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence.
For instance, it was uncontested that the Thomas's sought to refinance the US. Bank loan
through CitiMortgage and used BCT to close the refinance, (R. Vol. VI, pp. 1162-64, ~~ 3-6, lIB); that BCT made an inquiry to U.S. Bank about the payoff amount, which was answered by

Lisa Guinn of U.S. Bank with a screenshot, which she faxed over to BCT (R. Vol. VI, pp. 116263, ~~ 7-8); that BCT prepared the Release Demand Letter, (Tr. p. 58,11. 7-11); that the Release
Demand Letter called for hand delivery, (Tr. p. 58,11. 12); that it was BCT's procedure to
"always" staple the check to release demand letters, (Tr. p. 64,11.8-13; R. Vol. VI, p. 1164, ~
15); that the Check was deposited by US. Bank the same afternoon the CitiMortgage Loan was
closed, (Tr. p. 58,11. 13-21; R. Vol. VI, p. 1165, ~ 18); and that the Thomas's intended, and
instructed BCT as closing agent, to payoff and close the HELOC as part of the CitiMortgage
closing. (R. Vol. IV, pp. 776-78).
The court noted, and U.S. Bank did not dispute, that given the communications between BCT
and U.S. Bank, U.S. Bank knew the payoff was coming from a title company-not the Thomas's
seeking to ask to zero down their line of credit, (Tr. pp. 73-74,11.21-25, 1-5; R. Vol. VI, p.1163,
~

10); that only US. Bank knew about any prepayment penalty that could have caused US. Bank

not to immediately close the HELOC, (R. Vol. VI, p. 1163, ~ 9; see also Tr. p. 73,11. 5-21); and
that the "payoff' versus "pay down" procedures U.S. Bank used in November 2005 were
irregular. (R. Vol. VI, p. 1168, ~ 24).
Undisputed evidence provided the basis for the trial court to make certain reasonable
inferences supporting that the Release Demand Letter was delivered, which U.S. Bank likewise
never contested and are not the basis of this appeal. These include the court's observation that
the Release Demand Letter calls for delivery to U.S. Bank employee Lisa Guinn, and that the
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Check was most likely received by Lisa Guinn12, (see Tr. pp. 58-59,11. 22-25, 1-22, noting it is
the most reasonable inference that the Release Demand Letter was delivered because it is
undisputed that U.S. Bank received the Check and the only document in evidence directing
delivery of the check was the Release Demand Letter itself); that "payoff' means "close the line
of credit, release the deeds of trust," and the Check itself uses the term "Payoff," in the very
terms of U.S. Bank a "key" term - not "Pay to Zero." (Tr. p. 61, 11. 10-17,21-22).
Moreover, the District Court invited U.S. Bank to come forward with certain evidence which
could lead to inferences in favor of U.S. Bank, which U.S. Bank ultimately declined to do. (See
Tr. p. 76, 11. 2-9). For instance, the District Court observed U.S. Bank argued there was a certain
significance to US. Bank's "Payoff Form" versus US. Bank's "Pay To Zero Form." (Tr. p. 60,
11.14-16). Yet U.S. Bank put no evidence in the record about who was supposed to fill out either
the Payoff Form or the Pay To Zero Form, whether such form was actually required to be filled
out by BCT, or whether any such form was anything other than an internal form, which is the
inference the District Court ultimately drew from the documents presented by US. Bank. (Tr.
pp. 60-61,11. 16-25, 1-9). Regardless, it was undisputed that in or around November 2005, U.S.
Bank's branch payoffprocedures were irregular. (Tr.212-13, 11.4-25,1-14; Trial Exhibit 513)
(stating U.S. Bank "did not have the controls like we do today on HELOCS").
Given the District Court's extensive findings of facts and expressly stated inferences it drew
from undisputed facts concerning whether it was more likely than not that the Release Demand
Letter was delivered,13 the District Court's decision was not reversible error and must be upheld
on appeal.

12U.S. Bank does not dispute, and has never called into question the observation of the Court at the parties' cross
motions for summary judgment, the inference that Lisa Guinn of the Ketchum Branch of U.S. Bank processed the
Check and applied it to the Thomas's' account in full satisfaction of the HELOC. (See R. VoL I, pp. 115, 140).
13 The trial court noted for the first time at cross motions for summary judgment, "Looking at the probable
inferences - and I would say to start with, I see no presumptions either way. There are no presumptions in the law
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 13

2. The District Court Properly Declined to Consider Unintroduced Affidavit
Testimony and Evidence At Trial
U.S. Bank's first issue is that "the District Court failed to notice and consider crucial relevant
evidence." Appellant's Brief, p. 26. More specifically, U.S. Bank argues the District Court
should have "noticed" evidence "of what stapled check images look like," which were attached
to the AjJidavit ofKeith Powers in Support ofPlaintiff Us. Bank's Second Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment. Appellant's Brief, p. 26.
In support of its argument, U.S. Bank does not cite any testimony of Keith Powers at trial,
but instead points to the AjJidavit ofKeith Powers in Support ofPlaintiff Us. Bank's Second

Motionfor Partial Summary Judgment. See Appellant's Brief, p. 26-27 (citing R. Vol. III, pp.
636-53). Yet Power's affidavit and exhibits attached thereto were not only not evidence at trial,
but were expressly disregarded for summary judgment purposes pursuant to the District Court's

Third Order Limiting Trial Issues Pursuant to Rule 56(d). 14 (See R. Vol. IV, p. 780, ~ 2). For all
these affidavit exhibits' importance, U.S. Bank never sought to introduce those exhibits or
Powers' testimony concerning the exhibits at trial, and cannot now claim the trial court was
compelled to consider the evidence for trial on the narrow issue of whether the copies bore
visible staple holes. IS

3. The District Court Properly Relied on Evidence in the Record
U.S. Bank's second issue is that the District Court "relied on facts not in the record" when
making the solitary factual finding that imaging machinery could have "refilled" the staple holes

that work in either party's favor here ... This is a hand delivery issue, as I see it, and there's no presumptionsthere's no legal analysis or presumptions to put on this issue of delivery. I think it's a - both sides start-it's an
even heat here." (Tr. pp 57-58, 11. 21-24, 2-6).
14 The Third Order Limiting Trial Issues Pursuant to Rule 56(d) cites specifically to the hearing, which U.S. Bank
has failed to put into the record. (See R. Vol. IV, p. 780, stating the order was based upon " ... reasons stated in the
record ... ").
15 U.S. Bank cites myriad Idaho case law for the proposition that the trial court must weight conflicting evidence at
trial, but fails to explain how or why unintroduced evidence must be considered by the trial court.
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with existing paper. Appellant's Brief, p. 28 (citingR. Vol. VI, p. 1167,

~

12). Yet this finding

was supported by the testimony of both Powers and of Pearson at trial.
On cross examination, Powers testified about the refilling of paper as follows:
Q. (By Ms. Pickens) Could there be a situation where once a staple is removed,
the paper folds back and covers up the hole?
A. I suppose it's possible.
(Tr. p. 176,11. 1-4).
Powers further conceded this "possibility" when he then testified that he could not see staple
marks on copied pages 3 or 4 ofCitiMortgage's Trial Exhibit 516, which was later shown to be
copied under functionally indistinguishable conditions. 16 (Tr. p. 180, 11. 15-22; Tr. pp. 197-198,
11. 4-25, 1-12).
Additionally at trial, Pearson established that staple holes could, in fact, be refilled with
existing paper. Pearson testified that although she did not see the existence of staple marks on
pages 3 or 4 of Trial Exhibit 516, those were copies of a check that had, in fact, born staple
marks prior to scanning them. (Tr. pp. 197-199,11. 4-25, 1-11). As U.S. Bank's counsel
conceded at trial, a witness should be able to offer any testimony about her observations of a
demonstration, if relevant. (See Tr. p. 191, 11. 17-19). As will be further discussed in response
to another of U.S. Bank's arguments concerning the admissibility of Pearson's experiment, see
discussion infra, pp. 20-25, Pearson's testimony and observations in producing Trial Exhibit 516
are admissible and were properly considered by the Court.
Because it is "the province of the trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and
to judge the credibility of witnesses," this Court has held that it is constrained to "liberally
construe the trial court's findings of fact in favor ofthe judgment entered." Borah v.

McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 77, 205 P.3d 1209, 1213 (2009). The testimony from both parties'
16 Both the U.S. Bank check processing system and Pearson's "experiment" involved copying a stapled check at a
quality of 400 dpsi or better. (See Tr. pp. 177-79, 11. 18-25, 1-3; Tr. pp. 197-199, II. 4-25, 1-11).
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witnesses served the basis of the District Court's finding that "staple holes could be refilled with
existing paper." (See R. Vol. VI, p. 1167, ~ 22.) To the extent that finding contributes to the
ultimate decision that the Release Demand Letter was delivered (and, thus, CitiMortgage has
priority), this Court is constrained to liberally construe the findings of fact in favor of the
judgment entered for CitiMortgage.
Additionally, the District Court, as the trier of fact, is free to draw reasonable inferences from
the underlying facts. See Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 854, 727 P.2d 1279, 1281
(Ct. App. 1996)("Weighing of relative probabilities is a function to be perfonned by the trier of
fact."). It is reasonable to make the inference that that holes could have been covered up, and is
squarely within the fact finder's day-to-day experience that when punched by a staple, paper is
not necessarily punched out and may refold over a hole.
The District Court properly relied on evidence in the record in detennining the Check was
stapled, and therefore delivered with, the Release Demand Letter.

4. The District Court Properly Considered and Allocated the Burden of
Proof

u.s. Bank's third issue deals with the question of whether the District Court properly
considered and allocated the burden of proof in this case. U.S. Bank breaks up the issue into
three (3) largely redundant arguments, none of which squarely identifies what u.s. Bank assigns
as error. The District Court's findings make clear that CitiMortgage proved the Release Demand
Letter was delivered by a preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, the District Court correctly
concluded that I.e. §§ 45-1514 and 45-915 places the burden on U.S. Bank to release the deed of
trust once the obligation has been satisfied and demand has been made.
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a. CitiMortgage Proved the Release Demand Letter was Delivered by
a Preponderance of the Evidence
The crux of U.S. Bank's argument concerning burden of proof is that CitiMortgage did
not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Release Demand Letter was delivered.
There is simply no basis for

u.s. Bank's contention.

This Court has framed the issue of burden of proof as follows:
The term 'burden of proof has two distinct meanings. In its strict sense, the terms
denotes the duty of establishing the truth of a given proposition or issue by such a
quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case in which the issue arises,
whether civil or criminal. In a secondary sense, the term 'burden of proof is used
to designate the obligation resting upon a party to meet with evidence a prima
facie case created against him -- that is, the duty of proceeding with evidence at
the beginning, or at any subsequent stage of the trial in order to make or meet a
prima facie case.

Harman v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 91 Idaho 719, 721,429 P.2d 849, 852 (1967) (citing
with approval 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 123, p. 154).
Concerning the first prong of the term "burden of proof," CitiMortgage met its duty of
establishing the truth of the proposition that BCT had delivered the Release Demand Letter with
the Check by a preponderance of the evidence. Nearly all the evidence put forward at summary
judgment and at trial was brought forth by CitiMortgage in support of delivery of the Release
Demand Letter. See discussion supra, pp. 11-14. Moreover, much of the relevant evidence
offered by U.s. Bank lent itself to inferences contradicting U.S. Bank's allegations and
suppOliing the inference that u.s. Bank had most likely received the Release Demand Letter
with the Check, but had apparently misplaced or disregarded it following delivery. (See, e.g., R.
Vol. IV, pp. 779-81, determining on U.S. Bank's second motion for summary judgment that the
Check and Release Demand Letter would have been separated and sent out to different locations
to be imaged; R. Vol. VI, p. 1163, ~ 10, noting the issue of prepayment penalty raised by U.s.
Bank did not lend itselfto any inferences in its favor). This possibility was conceded by Powers
RESPOJ\i1)ENT'S BRIEF - 17

at trial. (See Tr. p. 181, 11. 7-10, agreeing that "under any circumstance in and about any
business there is a possibility of human error.").
Substantial evidence submitted by CitiMortgage exists supporting the finding that it was
more likely than not that the Release Demand Letter was delivered with the Check and, thus,
CitiMortgage has priority under I.e. § 45-1514.

b. The District Court Correctly Placed the Burden on U.S. Bank
As to the second prong of the term "burden of proof," denoting the duty of a party to
make his prima facie case before judgment can be entered in his favor, the District Court
correctly held that U.S. Bank had the duty to release the deed of trust upon satisfaction of the
obligation and delivery of demand pursuant to I.C. §§ 45-1514 and 45-915. (See R. Vol. VI, p.
1170, ~~ 4-6).
As a plaintiff seeking to establish priority in a judicial foreclosure action, U.S. Bank bore
the responsibility to prove that it had the right to judicially foreclose. Furthennore, I.e. § 451514 expressly placed the duty to release the U.S. Bank Deed of Trust upon satisfaction and
delivery of demand.
In this case, U.S. Bank has asserted a claim against CitiMortgage to the effect that U.S.
Bank's lien on the Property must be subordinated to U.S. Bank because U.S. Bank has no record
of receiving a Release Demand Letter. (See R. Vol. I, p. 21,

~

VII)(alleging in the Complaint,

"Defendant CitiMortgage, Inc.... claims an interest in the foregoing real property pursuant to a
Deed of Trust. ... The lien priority of the foregoing Deed of Trust should be declared by this
Court to be junior in its priority to that of the Plaintiff."); accord Appellant's Brief, p. 4
(conceding "U.S. Bank sought judgment, inter alia, that the U.S. Bank Deed of Trust was senior
in priority to the CitiMortgage Deed ofTrust."). Thus, as part of U.S. Bank's prima facie case, it

RESPONDENT'S BRlEF - 18

was U.S. Bank's duty to proceed with evidence and make its case why it was entitled to
judicially foreclose the property ahead of defendant CitiMortgage.
Having conceded CitiMortgage had caused the HELOC to be satisfied, the only relevant
question for U.S. Bank to prove was that no demand had been made of it as required under I.e.
§§ 45-1514 and 45-915. Following the finding that, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
Release Demand Letter had been delivered, the District Court correctly concluded that I.e. §§
45-1514 and 45-915 placed the burden of proof on U.S. Bank as the holder of the deed of trust to
release it upon demand or written request, which U.S. Bank failed to do. (R.1170, ~~ 4_6).17
Because CitiMortgage met its burden of proof that it delivered the Release Demand
Letter, the burden of proof shifts to U.S. Bank to prove its that demand was not made and it was
not put on notice. See Pace v. Hymas, 111 Idaho 581, 585, 726 P.2d 693,697 (1986). Yet U.S.
Bank failed to put on substantial evidence supporting its argument that the missing letter was due
to anything more than human error once it arrived at the Ketchum Branch of U.S. Bank.

5. The District Court Properly Admitted and Considered the Testimony of
Shannon Pearson
Notwithstanding that Powers admitted at trial the thesis of Pearson's experiment-that it
was possible that no staple marks were visible because the paper refilled the hole prior to
copying-U.S. Bank incorrectly argues that Pearson's testimony was not admissible at trial.

17 While delivery in the context of reconveyance of a deed of trust has not yet been addressed by this Court, the
Court's rationale of delivery in other contexts appears similarly appropriate here. For instance, the Court has long
held that "the real test of the delivery of a deed is this: Did the grantor by his acts or words, or both, intend to devest
[sic] himself of title? If so, the deed is delivered." See Flynn v. Flynn, 17 Idaho 147, 160, 104 P. 1030, 1034 (1909)
(holding "the burden of proof was upon the respondents to show under the facts of the case that there was no
delivery of the deed."). Where evidence exists that a deed of conveyance was duly executed, the prima facie
presumption arises that it has been duly delivered and the burden of proof thus rests on the party who asserts
nondelivery. See Brummund v. Romig, 59 Idaho 312, 317,81 P.2d 1085, 1088-89 (1938).
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a. The District Court Properly Admitted Pearson's Testimony
Because the Experiment Was Substantially Similar to the Original
Event
U.S. Bank incorrectly argues Pearson's trial testimony concerning her observations about
the ability of existing paper to refill staple holes cannot be considered because stapling and copy
conditions were not "substantially similar" to the stapling and copy conditions of U.S. Bank's
check imaging.
A witness's testimony recounting tests based upon different test conditions than existed at
the time ofthe original event will be upheld on appeal. Stoddard v. Nelson, 99 Idaho 293, 298,
581 P.2d 339,344 (1978). "The detennination of whether test conditions are sufficiently close to
actual conditions is left to the discretion of the trial court and will be reviewed on appeal only
upon a showing of an abuse of discretion." Id. In considering Pearson's testimony about her
observations and results of the experiment, the District Court properly used its discretion to
allow Pearson's staple hole and check imaging experiment, implicitly finding it was sufficiently
similar to U.S. Bank's imaging of staple holes on checks: both involved stapled paper which
was then copied at equivalent dpsi.18
U.S. Bank relies on Lopez v. Allen, 96 Idaho 866, 538 P.2d 1170 (1975)-an Employer
Liability Act case involving expert testimony about a creeping clutch pulley brake in a tractor
causing an employee's injuries-for the proposition that Pearson's testimony concerning the
ability of staple-punched paper to refill a hole prior to copying. The Lopez case is so
distinguishable from the case at bar that it actually helps emphasize how the general rule
concerning such comparative testimony is proper in this case.
In that case, a defendant's rebuttal expeli witness attempted to recreate the mechanical
braking accident under obviously incomparable conditions. There, the faulty clutch pulley brake
18 Powers testified that dpsi ("dots per square inch") of U.S. Bank's or its predecessor's system was 400 dpsi.
Pearson's experiment was done at 400 dpsi.
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had been adjusted prior to the experiment determining whether that particular tractor had a
tendency to creep. Further, the tractor at issue had been used during an unknown period of time
and to an unknown extent prior to the experiment and did not account for the physical
capabilities of the 13 year old compared to the adult mechanical expert in operating the creeping
tractor. !d. at 871, 538 P.2d at 1175. These variances between the original and test case were
obviously so fundamental to the question of whether the tractor creeped that the two were not
"substantially similar."
Here, no such variances are material, if any such variances exist at all. First and
foremost, the testimony here was not from an expert, 19 nor was the subject matter so specialized
such that expert testimony was even necessary: it is within the common knowledge of any fact
finder that a staple hole could be refilled with existing paper prior to being copied such that copy
holes are invisible, just like any fact finder has life experience sufficient to note that dots on a
copied page could just as easily be staple holes. See, e.g., Lopez, 96 Idaho at 871,538 P.2d at
1175 (noting expert testimony is needed only to the extent necessary "to assist the [fact finder] in
an intelligent understanding of the issues").
Second, the District Court determined that the experimental conditions here were
sufficiently similar so that Pearson's testimony was relevant and probative under LR.E. 401.
Both the original and recreated staple hole experiment dealt with check-weight paper, and the
recreated experiment took place under equal or even more stringent conditions of 400 dpsi. 2o

u.s. Bank urges this Court to find as a matter oflaw that the recreated experiment not be
considered because "the conditions of the experiment were completely dissimilar to the original

19 U.S. Bank mistakenly urges this Court to reject Pearson's experiment because it "was not conducted by an expert
at all." Appellant's Brief, p. 36. Of course, there is no requirement that all experiments need be conducted by an
"expert," and U.S. Bank likewise did not introduce any expert testimony at trial.
20 Power's affidavit testimony states that the dpsi of the U.S. Bank imaging equipment is 200 dpsi. CR. Vol. II, p.
641, ~ 15). Powers testified at trial that 400 dpsi would show more image, and would thus be more superior of an
image, to 200dpsi. (SeeTr. pp. 178-79,11. 22-25,1-3).
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event," Appellant's Brief, p. 36, but fails to explain how any such variances were material given
the obvious simplicity of narrow question at hand (whether a staple hole could be refilled so as to
be unseen on a 400 dpsi copy). Alternately put, the "sophistication" of an imaging machine
clearly has no bearing on the possibility of holes to be refilled with existing paper. On the other
hand, comparable dpsi of the respective machines is relevant, of which Pearson's was of better
quality. (See Tr. pp. 178-79,11.22-25, 1-3, testifying that 400 dpsi would show more than 200
dpsi). Ultimately, however, observations of an experiment against the Check image was one of
weight, which the trial court properly undertook as the fact finder.
Pearson's experiment was sufficiently close to the original copy conditions, and there is
no indication that the District Court's decision to admit the testimony was in error.

h. The District Court Properly Admitted Pearson's Testimony as a
Rebuttal Lay Witness to Powers
Next, U.S. Bank argues Pearson was not pennitted to testify because she was not
admitted or qualified as an expert. U.S. Bank argues that because observations and opinions
concerning the ability of paper to refill a hole and/or visibility of staple holes on copies are
scientific, technical or otherwise based on "specialized knowledge," the testimony is within the
scope of Rule 702, and is thus inadmissible. Appellant's Brief, p. 37. U.S. Bank is incorrect.
In support of its argument, U.S. Bank cites the Third Circuit opinion, Asplundh Mfg. Div.
v. Benton Harbor Eng'g, 57 F.3d 1190 (3d Cir. 1995), for the proposition that LR.E. 701 must be
construed to "protect against the use oflay witnesses to obtain admission of unreliable or
prejudicial experiments." Appellant's Brief, p. 38. Yet Asplundh Mfg. has been entirely
superseded on the point oflaw upon which U.S. Bank relies. See Estate of Knoster v. Ford

Motor Co., 200 Fed. Appx. 106, 111, fn. 3 (3d Cir. 2006). Moreover, that case, like Federal
Rule of Evidence 701 that superseded Asplundh Mfg. does not deal with admission of
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experiments. Instead, the issue in that case is a comment on the admission of opinions by lay
witnesses whose opinion is not reasonably reliable or helpful to the fact finder, and thus should
be excluded so as not to mislead ajury.21
In its briefing, u.s. Bank takes the inconsistent position of conceding that a lay witness
may testify as to investigatory findings and conclusions reached in the course of that person's
regular experience, but argues that Pearson's experience as a paralegal who obviously works
with stapled and copied documents on a daily basis does not qualify Pearson to testify about her
observations related to her experiment. U.S. Bank also argues that Pearson's testimony was
inadmissible because the experiment was "likely conducted at the behest of her employer,"
Pickens Law. U.S. Bank fails to distinguish between Pearson and Powers, who was a U.S. Bank
employee brought in expressly to opine about whether he could see staple marks?2
Moreover, Pearson's testimony-like the testimony of Powers-was not expert testimony
about specialized knowledge bearing on the possibility of staple holes to be refilled or otherwise
invisible on a copy. Instead, Pearson's testimony in the fon11 of opinions or inferences was
limited to those that were rationally based on her perception of her own experiment, and helpful
to a clear understanding of her testimony opening up the possibility of the invisibility of staple
holes on a copy of a stapled check, which was the ultimate fact to be proven at trial and is
squarely within the province ofLR.E. 701. See In re S. w., 127 Idaho 513, 518, 903 P.2d 102,
107 (Ct. App. 1995); see also Smith v. Praegitzer, 113 Idaho 887, 749 P.2d 1012 (Ct. App. 1988)
(lay witness opinion is admissible as probative, competent evidence, and the weight to be given
it rests with the trier of fact). The trial court clearly considered and weighed the testimony of
21 Again, it is notable that U.S. Bank employee Keith Powers was likewise not an expert in the case, yet offered an
opinion as to the absolute invisibility of the Check full of "noise"-small dots and marks throughout the imagewhich should meet similar objections under LR.E. and F.R.E. 701, if any are warranted at all.
22 It is notable that nowhere in the record does Powers testify that he ever compared the original, physical Check to
the copies in U.S. Bank's system-much less has any experience doing so with other check images to verify that as
an absolute rule, there is never an occasion by which an original check could bear staple marks that would be unseen
on a copy.
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both Pearson and Powers in considering whether staple holes could be deemed to have actually
existed on the actual Check in view of each person's testimony, and the exhibits introduced at
trial.
c. The District Court Properly Weighed Pearson's Testimony
Finally, as to the weight of Pearson's testimony, U.S. Bank argues that because Pearson
did not offer an opinion as to the existence of staple holes in a copy of the Check, that none of
her testimony should have been considered by the trial court.
As discussed above, the essence of Pearson's testimony was to establish the observation
and inference that while staple holes could exist in an original check, a scanned check could lack
visible staple marks, as pennitted by LR.E. 701. Idaho Rule of Evidence 402 requires, "All
relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or by other rules
applicable in the courts ofthis state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Further,
"relevant evidence" is defined as, "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the detennination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence." LR.E. 401.
The trial court properly relied on Pearson's testimony to the extent that the testimony
assisted the trial court in establishing that staple marks are not always visible on copies (a fact
that was also admitted by Powers), took notice of U.S. Bank's Trial Exhibits which had a
significant amount of "noise" and may have otherwise contained a holes where anyone of the
dust specks appeared, took notice of BCT procedures23 to "always" staple checks to demand
letters when delivering them to banks as part of closing transactions, and rationally found that the
Check was stapled to the Release Demand Letter. The trial court's findings were based on
substantial and competent evidence, and therefore must be upheld by this Court.
23 BeT's procedures to always include a release demand letter with the payoff check and the procedure to always
staple checks is relevant habit and routine practice of the business in accordance with LR.E. 406.
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6. The District Court Properly Found That the Release Demand Letter was
Stapled to the Check and Delivered to U.S. Bank on November 29, 2005,
By a Preponderance of the Evidence
Finally, U.S. Bank incorrectly argues that it introduced uncontradicted evidence at trial
concerning the invisibility of staple marks at trial, so it is entitled to reversal of the District
Court's judgment declaring CitiMortgage has priority. In addition to the extensive undisputed
evidence brought forward by CitiMortgage during pretrial motions concerning the delivery of the
Release Demand Letter as part ofthe closing, which the Court observed in its final ruling
following trial, there was sufficient evidence at trial for the trial court to find that staple holes
may have existed on the Check. 24
First, as discussed at length above, the visibility of staple holes was not dispositive to the trial
court's ruling that the Release Demand Letter was delivered to U.S. Bank. See discussion supra,
pp. 11-14.
Second, Power's own testimony was contradictory of his opinion that no staple holes were
visible. Powers testified on cross that it was possible that staple holes were on the actual Check,
but could be refilled prior to copying, thus rendering them invisible on the copies Powers
examined. (Tr. p. 176,11. 1-4). Powers likewise testified that dots on various portions of U.S.
Bank's Trial Exhibit 56 could be staple marks as they correlated with separately scanned images
of the Check. (Tr. pp. 172-73,11.3-25,1-15). Powers specifically testified that it was possible
that there could have been a staple hole anywhere in the "Endorse Here" language on the Check
that would not be detected on the scan. (Tr. 175: 10-16). This testimony was expressly relied
upon by the trial court in finding that the Check and Release Demand Letter had been stapled
together. (See R. Vol. VI, pp. 1166-67, ~ 21).

24 Attached hereto as Addendum 1 is the Release Demand letter from Blaine County Title. Attached hereto as
Addendum 2 is a copy of the Check.
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Third, the Court ultimately found, and the record is uncontradicted, that BCT's routine
practice is to staple checks to demand letters:
Q: ... how do you know that whichever Blaine County Title person took
the check and Release Demand Letter from Blaine County Title to U.S. Bank
didn't somehow perhaps accidentally separate the Release Demand Letter
and the check in transit?
A: The check was stapled to the letter.
Q: And you personally saw the check stapled to the letter?
A: No, I didn't personally see that. We have covered that. I didn't
personally see the letter that I recall. I may have. Letters of this nature that are
delivered locally are stapled, not paper clipped, for that very reason. So that
it doesn't get separated from the letter. If that letter did get separated from
that check it would not have been delivered.

(R. Vol. II, p. 441, 69:4-22; R. Vol. II, p. 444, 25:18-22; see also R. Vol. I, p. 76, ~ 28; R. Vol.
VI, p. 1164, ~ 15).
Given the uncontradicted evidence that BCT's routine practice was to deliver a demand for
release of a deed of trust with the payment, substantial and competent evidence existed
supporting the conclusion that it was more likely than not that the Check was delivered with the
Release Demand Letter in this case. See LR.E. 406 ("Evidence of ... the routine practice of an
organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is
relevant to prove the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in
conformity of the habit or routine practice.")
Fourth, and finally, the trial court was fully able to compare the check images introduced by
U.S. Bank as Trial Exhibit 56 on its own to determine if staple marks looked to be apparent. In
this respect, while admitted at trial, Power's opinion about the actual visibility of staple marks
was conclusory and ultimately not useful given it did not aid the trial court in determining
something it could see on its own. 25

25 Attached as Addendum 1 to this brief is the Release Demand Letter from Blaine County Title. Attached as
Addendum 2 to this brief is a copy of Check.
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C. The Release Demand Letter Properly Demanded Reconveyance

U.S. Bank's last argument on appeal is that "the Release Demand Letter was ineffective
as a demand for reconveyance for failure to comply with

I.e. § 45-1203." Appellant's Brief, p.

42. However, this argument fails because the letter properly made demand upon U.S. Bank as
required by I.C. §§ 45-1514 and 45-915, and because I.C. § 45-1203 is inapplicable.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises de
novo review. V-I Oil Co. v. Idaho State Tax Com 'n, 134 Idaho 716, 718, 9 P.3d 519,521 (2000).
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive legislative intent. Albee v. Judy, 136 Idaho
226, 230, 31 P.3d 248, 252 (2001). Analysis begins with the language of the statute, which is
given its plain, usual and ordinary meaning. BHC Intermountain Hasp., Inc. v. Ada County, 150
Idaho 93, 93, 244 P.3d 237, 239 (2010). Any ambiguities in the statute must be construed with
legislative intent in mind, which is ascertained by examining not only the literal words of the
statute, but the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and
its legislative history. Id. (citations omitted). Where the language of a statute is unambiguous,
there is no need to consult extrinsic evidence. City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho
665,667,851 P.2d 961,963 (1993).
As the beneficiary of its deed of trust,

u.s.

Bank was required to reconvey its interest

immediately upon satisfaction of the Thomas's' obligation and delivery of the Release Demand
Letter. Idaho Code § 45-1514 states:
Upon performance of the obligation secured by the deed of trust,
the trustee upon written request of the beneficiary shall reconvey
the estate of real property described in the deed of trust to the
grantor; providing that in the event of such performance and the
refusal of any beneficiary to so request or the trustee to so
reconvey, as above provided, such beneficiary or trustee shall
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be liable as provided by law26 in the case of refusal to execute a
discharge or satisfaction of a mortgage on real property.
I.e. § 45-1514 (emphasis added).
The above-referenced "law" governing liability in the case of the beneficiary's failure to
reconvey a deed oftrust is I.e. § 45-915, which provides in relevant part as follows:
When any mortgage, affecting the title to real property, has been satisfied,
the holder thereof or his assignee must immediately, on the demand of the
mortgagor, purchaser, or the successor in interest of either, execute,
acknowledge, and deliver to him a certificate of the discharge thereof so as to
entitle it to be recorded, or he must enter satisfaction or cause satisfaction of
such mortgage or affecting the title to real property, to be entered of record.

I.e. § 45-915 (emphasis added); see also Brinton v. Haight, 125 Idaho 324, 329, 870 P.2d 677,
682, fn. 4 (1994), noting I.e. §§ 45-1514 and 45-9] 5 must be construed in pari materia).

It is undisputed that the Thomas's satisfied their obligation with U.S. Bank. Thus, in
order to effect a reconveyance, only "demand" was required to evoke I.e. §§ 45-1514 and 45915's mandate that U.S. Bank "immediately" reconvey its deed of trust. See Brinton, 125 Idaho
324, 332, 870 P.2d 677, 685 (1994)(noting that "Section 45-1514 is identical in purpose to
Section 45-915 in that both mandate that the encumbrance 'shall' be released upon satisfaction of
the obligation"). Further, the Release Demand Letter unambiguously demanded reconveyance of
the U.S. Bank Deed of Trust. (See R. Vol. V, p. 1110).
U.S. Bank does not address the mandate of I.e. §§ 45-1514 and 45-915 upon it as
beneficiary in its briefing, but rather points to the non-mandatory statute I.e. § 45-1203 as
authority that BeT was first "required" to follow I.e. § 45-1203 in making demand upon U.S.
Bank. See Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848, 908 P.2d 1143, 150 (1995)(noting that when used

26

The referenced law governing liability in the case of refusal to execute a discharge or satisfaction of a mortgage is
Brinton v. Haight, 125 Idaho 324, 329, 870 P.2d 677,682, fn. 4 (1994).

I.e. § 45-915.
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III

a statute, the word "shall" means mandatory, and "may"

IS

permissive).

U.S. Bank

misconstrues the statute.
In short, U.S. Bank argues that because demand was not dated and did not set forth the
disclosures of I.C. § 45-1203, it was "ineffective." However, I.C. § 45-1203 is inapplicable
according to the plain language of the statute, which provides:
§ 45-1203. Procedure for reconveyance
A title insurer or title agent may execute and record a reconveyance of a trust
deed upon compliance with the following procedure:
(l) Not less than thirty (30) days after payment in full of the obligation secured
by the trust deed and receipt of satisfactory evidence of payment in full has been
effected, the title insurer or title agent may either: (a) mail a notice by certified
mail with postage prepaid, return receipt requested, to the beneficiary or a servicer
at its address set forth in the trust deed, and at any address for the beneficiary or
servicer specified in the last recorded assignment of the trust deed, if any, and at
any address for a beneficiary or servicer shown in any request for notice duly
recorded pursuant to section 45-1511, Idaho Code; or (b) hand deliver a notice to
the beneficiary or servicer. The notice shall be in substantially the following form
and shall be accompanied by a copy of the reconveyance to be recorded:

(2) Sixty (60) days shall elapse following the mailing, in the case of certified
mail, or delivery, in the case of hand delivery, of the notice prescribed in
subsection (l) of this section.
(3) If the title insurer or title agent has not upon expiration of that sixty (60)
day period received any objection under section 45-1204, Idaho Code, the title
insurer or title agent may then execute, acknowledge, and record a reconveyance
of the trust deed in substantially the following form:
(4) A reconveyance of a trust deed, when executed and acknowledged in
substantially the form prescribed in subsection (3) of this section shall be entitled
to recordation and, when recorded, shall constitute a reconveyance of the trust
deed identified therein, irrespective of any deficiency in the reconveyance
procedure not disclosed in the release or reconveyance that is recorded other than
forgery of the title insurer or title agent's signature....
I.C. § 45-1203 (emphasis added).
The plain language of the statute simply provides a mechanism for a title company to
unilaterally record a reconveyance if a lender has failed to record a reconveyance itself, and only
if the title company wishes to do so. In that event, the title company has the ability-but not the
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duty-to undertake the following procedures set out in I.C. § 45-1203, which require specific
content in order to give appropriate notice to the deed holder?7 Yet nothing exists in Idaho code
or case law that places a duty upon title companies to take such affirmative steps to compel the
release ofa deed oftrust. 28 See generally Chapter 12, Title 45, Idaho Code (stating a title insurer
or title agent "may" take steps to reconvey a deed of trust).
The plain language of I.C. §§ 45-1514 and 45-915 are that the beneficiary "shall"
"immediately" release the deed of trust upon satisfaction and demand. In contrast, the language
of I.C. § 45-1203 is permissive, while merely providing an alternative option for recording a
reconveyance exercisable by a third party title company a minimum of several months after
demand has been made. Moreover, such is the most reasonable interpretation because taking the
alternative approach urged by U.S. Bank would render I.C. §§ 45-1514 and 45-915 meaningless.
Given the plain language ofLC. §§ 45-1514 and 45-915-and notwithstanding the ability
of a title company to follow up under I.e. § 45-1203-the demand for reconveyance was
effective as a matter of law.

D. CitiMortgage is Entitled to Attorney Fees Pursuant to I.e. §§ 45-915 and 45-1514
Due to U.S. Bank's Failure to Reconvey Its Deed of Trust
CitiMortgage submits the final question before this Court, which is whether the District
Court should have awarded fees against U.S. Bank. CitiMortgage identified three (3) statutory
bases for award of its fees in defending the action, namely, I.C. §§ 45-1514 and 45-915, I.C. §
12-121, and I.e. § 10-1210. The District Court denied fees based of the first two grounds after
Idaho Code § 45-1202 gives authority to a title insurer or title agent to reconvey a trust deed under the procedures
set forth in I.C. § 45-1203. Specifically, if the title insurer or title agent complies with the requirements of I.e. § 451203, then the title agent or title insurer is authorized to reconvey the deed of trust "whether or not it is then
names as a trustee under the trust deed." In other words, I.C. § 45-1203 only applies if a title insurer or a title
agent intends to "execute and record a reconveyance of a trust deed," I.e. § 45-1203, regardless of the named
beneficiary and trustee.
28 Even a cursory review of the statutes reveals that both statutes use the permissive "may" throughout; not once is
the mandatory "shall" used. Clearly, compliance with LC. §45-1202 and 45-1203 is not mandatory as U.S. Bank
states.
27
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making specific findings, which CitiMortgage contends was an abuse of discretion.
Additionally, however, the District Court did not make findings based on I.e. § 10-1210, which
is reversible error.
1. CitiMortgage is Entitled to Its Fees Under I.e. §§ 45-1514 and 45-915

The District Court denied an award ofCitiMortgage's fees under I.C. §§ 45-1514 and 45915 for two independent reasons, first, that CitiMortgage was not entitled to fees because they
were not claimed and proven at trial (Tr. 235:15-24); and second, because there was a bona fide
dispute and no showing of bad faith. (Tr. 241 :17-24).
First, the District Court abused its discretion because Idaho Code §§ 45-1514 and 45-915
require an award of attorney fees when a lender fails to reconvey a deed of trust as a matter of
law. Section 45-1514 provides, in full, as follows:
Upon performance of the obligation secured by the deed of trust, the trustee upon
written request of the beneficiary shall reconvey the estate of real property
described in the deed of trust to the grantor; providing that in the event of such
performance and the refusal of any beneficiary to so request or the trustee to so
reconvey, as above provided, such beneficiary or trustee shall be liable as
provided by law in the case of refusal to execute a discharge or satisfaction of
a mortgage on real property.
(Emphasis added).
Turning to I.C. § 45-915-the parallel statute addressing satisfaction of a mortgage on
real property alluded to in I.e. § 45-1514--payment of damages are addressed as follows:
When any mortgage, affecting the title to real property, has been satisfied, the
holder thereof or his assignee must immediately, on the demand of the mortgagor,
purchaser, or the successor in interest of either, execute, acknowledge, and deliver
to him a certificate of the discharge thereof so as to entitle it to be recorded, or he
must enter satisfaction or cause satisfaction of such mortgage or affecting the title
to real property, to be entered of record; and any holder, or assignee of such
holder, who refuses to execute, acknowledge, and deliver to the mortgagor,
purchaser, or the successor in interest of either, the certificate of discharge, or to
enter satisfaction, or cause satisfaction of the mortgage to be entered, as provided
in this chapter, is liable to the mortgagor, purchaser, or his grantee or heirs,
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for all damages which he or they may sustain by reason of such refusal, and
shall also forfeit to him or them the sum of $ 100.
(Emphasis added).
Construing the damages provision ofLC. § 45-915, this Court first held that the attomey
fees were recoverable as damages in Cornelison v. United States Bldg. & Loan Ass 'n, 50 Idaho
1,292 P. 243 (1930), holding as follows:
Error is also sought to be predicated upon the action of the court in finding and
concluding that respondents are entitled to recover $ 400 as damages. C. S., sec.
6369, supra, provides that any mortgagee who refuses to cause satisfaction of
the mortgage to be entered when fully paid shall be liable to the mortgagor
for all damages sustained by reason of such refusal. Attorney's fees incurred
as the result of necessity of bringing action to compel cancelation of the
mortgage are recoverable as damages. (2 Jones on Mortgages, 8th ed., p. 765,
citing Kelly v. Narregang Inv. Co., 41 S.D. 222, 170 N.W. 131.)

Cornelison, 50 Idaho at 11,292 P. at 246.
Subsequently, in Head v. Crone, 76 Idaho 196,279 P.2d 1064 (1955), the Court
reaffirmed the rule that any violation ofLC. § 45-915 would require the lender failing to release
the mortgage to pay the attomey fees resulting from the lender's wrongful refusal. See id. at 20102,279 P.2d at 1066-67. Thus, read in pari materia with LC. § 45-915, Section 45-1514
requires that U.S. Bank pay CitiMortgage's attomey fees as costs in accordance with LR.C.P.
54(e)(5) for failing to release the U.S. Bank Deed of Trust on the property, without
qualification.

29

Here, the District Court's decision not to grant attomey fees in this case was an abuse of
discretion. The District Court's determination of whether grounds existed to award attomey fees
is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. See State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 589, 592,
977 P.2d 203,206 (1999) (citing Miller v. EchoHawk, 126 Idaho 47,878 P.2d 746 (1994)
("Factual findings that are the basis for an exercise of discretion ... are subject to a substantial
29 Attorney fees as allowed by contract or statute must be "deemed as costs in an action and processed in the same as
costs," which shall be supported by an affidavit of the attorney. I.R.C.P.54(e)(5).
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and competent evidence standard of review."». In reviewing an exercise of discretion, this Court
must consider "(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho

Power Co., 119 Idaho 87,94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).
In this case, the District Court did not perceive the issue as one of discretion.
CitiMortgage defended the action and as such was not required to plead or present evidence of
damages as attorney fees. Instead, I.C. §§ 45-1514 and 45-915 require an award of fees after the
action has been finally detennined by the court. Additionally, a plain reading of the statute
reveals that CitiMortgage is entitled to all damages-including attorney fees-irrespective of
any penalty assessed against U.S. Bank for bad faith practices. 3o Common sense shows that both
provisions should not be made contingent on the mindset of a lender: attorney fees simply make
the wronged party whole, while any statutory fine that is "penal in nature" should therefore be
"strictly construed," therefore requiring a showing of bad faith.

30 Idaho case law does not indicate an award of attorney fees must be treated the same as the $100 penalty provision
in I.C. § 45-915. While the penalty portion necessarily requires some mens rea on the part of the lender, damages
and attorney fees have consistently been treated separate and apart from the penalty analysis in Idaho case law. The
clear and unambiguous language ofI.C. § 45-915 sets out two separate categories of recovery-disjunctive and
separated by a comma and including the connective "and" for even further clarity-for any violation of the Statute:
fIrst, "damages which he ... may sustain by reason of such refusal"; and second, a forfeit-which is a fIne or
"penalty"-of$100. Statutory interpretation begins with the literal words of the statute, giving the language its
plain, obvious and rational meaning. Hayes v. Kingston, 140 Idaho 551, 553, 96 P.3d 652, 654 (2004). On its face it
is apparent that the statute deals with an award of "damages" and a forfeit of $1 00 as a "statutory penalty"
differently.
For instance, in Head v. Crone, 76 Idaho 196,200-201,279 P.2d 1064, 1065-66, the Court addressed with the
$100 penalty provision separate and apart from attorney fees payable by the wrongful lender. In that case, only after
discussing whether prospective profIts could be deemed certain enough to be chargeable as damages against the
lender, the Court then turned toward its analysis of the $100 penalty referenced in the suit. Furthermore, common
sense shows that both provisions should not be made contingent on the mindset of a lender: attorney fees simply
make the wronged party whole, while any statutory fIne that is "penal in nature" should therefore be "strictly
construed," therefore requiring a showing of bad faith, as case law suggests.
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Furthemlore, even ifbad faith was required before attomey fees are awarded, there were
no findings made with regard to whether the matter was a "bona fide dispute or a good
controversy exists" sufficient to support a denial of attomey fees. Consequently, the District
Court acted outside of acceptable legal standards and did not reach its decision by an exercise of
reason.

2. CitiMortgage is Entitled to its Fees Under I.e. § 12-121
Next, the District Court erred when it declined to award CitiMortgage its attomey fees
pursuant to I.e. § 12-121. The basis of the denial was that it found there was an actual dispute as
to delivery of the Release Demand Letter, without considering that U.s. Bank required to be
brought to trial the question of visibility of staple marks on a copy of a check, which the District
Court at all times wamed would not be dispositive of the issue. The court's denial of fees under
I.C. § 12-121 did not take into account the procedural nature of the Statute. See Wetzel v.

Goldsmith (In re Comstock), 16 Bankr. 206, 209 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1981)(noting that I.C. § 12121 "deals instead with the inherent right of courts to control, when circumstances demand,
vexatious practices before them."). Idaho Code § 12-121 inherently recognizes the trial court's
power to award fees where a party acts in bad faith or vexatiously, which in some cases could
warrant an award of attomey fees in order to make the prevailing party whole. See id. at 210.
In pursuing the case, U.S. Bank took a hard line stance. U.S. Bank ignored the District
Court's repeated wamings that staple marks on electronically-stored copies of checks would not
be dispositive of the priority issue and proceeded to trial on that single issue. U.S. Bank filed
multiple nearly identical summary judgment motions on timelines and addressing issues outside
the Court's scheduling and partial summary judgment orders. U.S. Bank filed numerous
obviously defective affidavits and futile motions to strike many ofCitiMortgage's papers, which
the Court declined to grant. Taken together, it is clear that U.S. Bank pursued its case against
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CitiMortgage frivolously, unreasonably, and in bad faith for the singular, inappropriate, and
vexatious purpose of running up attorney fees. As such, it is the inherent right of the court to
control such vexatious practices by awarding CitiMortgage its fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121.

3. The Court Erred in Failing to Address an Award of Fees Under I.e. § 101210
At hearing on attorney fees, the District Court abused its discretion by failing to make
findings under I.C. § 10-1210 before denying CitiMortgage's attorney fees award.
Idaho Code § 10-1210 authorizes an award of costs in declaratory actions 3l "as may seem
equitable and just." The Court may utilize I.C. § 10-1210 as an alternative to I.R.C.P.
54(d)(1)(D) to apportion discretionary costs "upon a showing that said costs were necessary and
exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the
adverse party." Univ. ofIdaho Foundation, Inc. v. Civic Partners, Inc., 146 Idaho 527, 545,199
P.3d 102,120 (2008). However, an award of costs under I.C. § 10-1210 is proper where a party
chooses to pursue "novel arguments and approaches to try to advance [its] interests and to relieve
itselfofits obligations." !d. at 545-46,199 P.3d at 120-121. Where equity and justice shows
that, as between the parties, one party should bear those costs, the court should so order. !d.
Here, for the reasons more fully set forth above with regard to CitiMortgage's fee award
pursuant to I.C. § 12-121, equity and justice requires that as between the parties, U.S. Bank
should be required to pay CitiMortgage's attorney fees because it chose to pursue legally and
factually unsupportable arguments, and despite the Court's repeated warnings, chose to run up
attorney fees and in its pursuit of choosing to take inapposite issues to trial.

In its Complaint, US. Bank requested that "lien priority of the [CitiMortgage] Deed of Trust ... be declared by
this Court to be junior in its priority to that of [U S . Bank]", ~ VII, at pg. 4; and requesting in its prayer for relief,
"That the liens and interests of any of the remaining Defendants herein be declared junior and subordinate to the lien
priority of Plaintiff US. Bank .... ", at pg. 7.
31

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 35

It is proper that this case be remanded to District court because the Court failed to make
findings specific to I.C. § 10-1210.

IV. ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL
Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41 allow for an award of costs and attorney fees to the
prevailing party. Attorney fees on appeal are appropriate under I.A.R. 41 if the appellate court is
left without an abiding beliefthat the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation. Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 74, 785 P.2d 634,
638 (1990). An award of attorney fees is appropriate ifthe appeal does no more than simply
invite the appellate court to second-guess the trial court on conflicting evidence, or if the law is
well settled and the appellant has made no substantial showing that the lower court misapplied
the law, or on review of discretion, no cogent challenge is presented with regard to the trial
judge's exercise of discretion. Pass v. Kenny, 118 Idaho 445, 449, 767 P.2 153, 157 (Ct. App.
1990); Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012, 1018,829 P.2d 1361, 1367 (Ct. App. 1991).
In the present case, U.S. Bank is vigorously arguing that the District Court's decision,
which was based on conflicting evidence, should be reversed. U.S. Bank erroneously argues that
disputed evidence is undisputed, that the trial court failed to cite its standard of review ofthe
evidence when the court made specific findings based on the preponderance of the evidence and
concerning burden of proof pursuant to I.C. §§ 45-1514 and 45-915. Because U.S. Bank has
brought this appeal unreasonably and without foundation, has made no substantial showing that
the District Court misapplied the law, and has failed to cogently challenge the trial court's
exercise of discretion, CitiMortgage should be entitled to their attorney fees on appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, CitiMortgage respectfully requests it be awarded attorney fees
on appeal.
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V. CONCLUSION
The District Court properly found that that the CitiMortgage Deed of Trust has priority
over the U.S. Bank Deed of Trust, that the Check was stapled to the Release Demand Letter and
delivered to U.S. Bank, and that the Release Demand Letter was effective to require that U.S.
Bank reconvey the deed of trust. However, the District Court erred by failing to award
CitiMortgage its attorney fees under I.C. §§ 45-1514 and 45-915, by failing to award
CitiMortgage its fees under I.C. § 12-121, and by failing to make additional findings awarding
CitiMortgage its fees under I.C. § 10-1210.
Respondent/Cross Appellant respectfully requests that this Court affinn the District Court
and find that Respondents have priority over Appellants. Respondent! Cross Appellant further
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's decision that Respondent/Cross
Appellant is not entitled to attorney fees, and award their their costs and fees on appeal.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _---''-- day of December, 2013.

PICKENS LAW, P.A.

Attorney for CitiMortgage, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of December, 2013, two true and correct
copies of the foregoing document were served as follows:
Terry C. Copple
Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, LLP
199 North Capitol Blvd., Ste. 600
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorney for Plaintiff

[ ] First Class Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[\.f1-Iand delivery

Terri R. Pickens
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ADDENDUM 1

360 Sun Valley Rd.
Ketchum, ID 83340
Phone (208) 726-0700 I (800) 346-6879
Fax (208) 726-8406

BLAINE COUNTYTITJ.E

RELEASE DEMAND LETTER
Date:

Escrow Number: 5014425

US Bank
Attn: Lisa Gwen
Hand Deliver
RE:

Your Loan No.
Borrower:
Property Address:

00003000398652
Herbert T. Thomas and Julie A. Thomas, husband and wife
104 Grey Eagle
Sun Valley, Idaho 83353

In connection with the above-referenced escrow, please find our check # 13219 in the amount of
$1,843,807.40. You are authorized to use said funds in connection with your Loan Number
00003000398652 when you are in a position to deliver a Deed of Reconveyance of a Deed of
Trust or Release of Mortgage from the above referenced borrower, recorded as Instrument No.
526727.
We demand that the Deed of Reconveyance or Release of Mortgage be delivered to the
undersigned within 30 days, as provided by statute.
Please forward any excess funds or escrow reserves to your borrower at:
Name:
Herbert T. Thomas and Julie A. Thomas, husband and wife
Address:
PO Box 2136
Sun Valley, ID 83353
Please forward all original documents to:
Blaine County Title Associates
POBox3176
Ketchum, ID 83340
Attn: Reconveyance Dept.
If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to contact the undersigned at 208-726-0700 I
800-346-6879
/

Blaine County Title File Number: 5014425
Release Demand Letter - Buyer/Borrower. Loan I

BCT000180

ADDENDUM 2

.'

.

".:

U.S~"'BankConfjpential

communication

Requested by: Jacob Coillen
Th1s, c~~I<, image contains confidentla.llnformatlon. If you prtnt this Jmage, pl~ase,store,lt ,in ,8 secure place to avoid unau~hOr.lzed usage of c,
this information, rncreased securitY'awareness,whe.n :dJs~ardlng p:r,deSt'roylng 'this'docLimerit'ls'rticommerided.::' .,' ;:'" " :::' ':. "':' :,;': ::::: ~',-,,,

Item

#2

Account No.: 130042773
Amount; 1843807.40

Check No.:: '
RoUtin No.: 12410376

Sequence No.: 003535158296
Date:

11

29/2005 ' "

Front:
l'

',.

BLAINE COUNTY TITLE ASSOCIA res

, TrustAccount

P.O. BolC31711
ICbtdlm.1ll a33«l
(208) m.t>l'OO

'" "

---

Fim Bank of fdaJ10

2·13219

tUMliftk9.D.b~

~/114i

t112912005

P~y One

Million Eight Hundred Forty Three Thousand Eght Hundred Seven and $ $1.843,1lll7.-ro
401100 Dollans
•

To the order of - US Bank
Loan No. 00003000398652
Payoff Loan
Fl1.. : 51]14425

Back:

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

C1t1~ID
https:/liroage.us.bank·dns.com/image/JSPlReportX l.j sp

2/23/2011
USBANKOOOO6:1.

